An Old Post on Why I Think Theism is Irrational

Note: I posted this elsewhere a few years ago, and I’m posting it here to save it.

Consider the following argument.

1. The belief that God exists needs to be supported by evidence to be rational.
2. The belief that God exists is not supported by evidence.
3. Therefore, the belief that God exists is not rational.

The conclusion follows deductively from the premises, so the question is whether the premises are true. Both premises of this argument are controversial in philosophy of religion.

Premise 1 is primarily denied by Reformed epistemologists like Alvin Plantinga. I have read a number of Plantinga’s books, and I don’t find his arguments convincing. However, Plantinga has gone through multiple phases in his intellectual development and it would take considerable space to address all of these phases convincingly. Instead, I’ll just list a couple of general considerations and let people ask questions.

First, the belief that God exists is not comparable to beliefs like belief in the external world or belief in other minds, because a sane, informed person can seriously deny that God exists and not that the external world or other minds exist. Even people who believe that the external world or other minds don’t exist have to assume that they do exist in order to put forward their arguments.

Second, we do have some evidence that the external world or other minds exist, even if this can’t be put in the form of a deductive argument for the conclusion that an external world and other minds exist. We observe the external world, and we see other people move in ways that suggest that they are conscious. Plantinga does claim that we have this sort of evidence for God’s existence as well through religious experience and the like, but it seems unlikely that religious experience could sufficiently ground a large scale cosmological hypothesis.

Premise 2 would require a lot of analysis to establish convincingly. What one would have to do would be to choose a dozen or so of the most prominent arguments for God’s existence, then analyze each of them in depth to show that they do not support the claim that God exists. However, this has been done by atheists like Michael Martin in his book Atheism: A Philosophical Justification and Herman Philipse in his book God in the Age of Science?, and I cannot repeat their whole analysis here. Again, what I will do is offer up some general considerations and let people ask questions.

There are a number of versions of the problem of evil that cast doubt on any attempt to establish the God hypothesis. Here are a few examples.

• The problem of animal suffering argues that God would not allow animals to suffer so horribly over the course of millions of years of evolution. We would expect a loving, omnipotent, omniscient God to avert these millions of years of suffering if at all possible, so the fact that we do observe that these millions of years of suffering have happened seems to count against the God hypothesis.
• The problem of divine hiddenness argues that people who seek God honestly should always find him if God is loving and wants to establish a relationship with everyone, but they do not, so divine hiddenness seems to count against the God hypothesis. This has been developed in more detail by J. L. Schellenberg.
• The problem of horrendous suffering argues that particularly horrific cases of suffering count against the existence of God. For example, suppose a man comes across a woman alone in the forest, cuts off her arms with an axe, rapes her, and leaves her to die. It seems like a loving, omnipotent, omniscient God would prevent this if we know anything at all about what is good or evil, but he does not, so horrific suffering seems to count against the God hypothesis.

Now, I recognize that these arguments may be objected to on the grounds that we cannot know for sure what God has good reasons to do or not do, since we are not omniscient like he is. I have two responses to this.

First, I am not offering these arguments from evil as attempts to disprove or provide evidence against the existence of God, but as attempts to provide observations that count against the God hypothesis in the sense of making the God hypothesis more difficult to establish. The real work here is being done by premise 1, which says that the believer needs to provide evidence for God, and these arguments from evil are really just attempts to make it harder for the believer to accomplish that.

Second, arguing that God might have reasons of which we are unaware for allowing apparently bad events creates a skepticism about whether we ever know what we have reason to do. If a man coming across a woman in the forest, cutting her arms off with an axe, raping her, and leaving her for dead can be overall a good thing, how can we say that we know that anything is ultimately good or bad?

So, I conclude that the belief that God exists is not rational on the basis of my initial argument. Thanks for reading, and I look forward to your comments.

Subjective

Sometimes people are inclined to describe an area of inquiry, like morality, as subjective. However, it is important to separate out two senses of the word “subjective,” which I will call the metaphysical sense and the epistemological sense.

• An area is metaphysically subjective if there actually are no objective criteria for deciding questions in that area of inquiry.
• An area is epistemologically subjective if there are objective criteria for deciding questions in that area, but we don’t know what they are.

Every area of inquiry is epistemologically subjective prior to discovering the objectively correct criteria to employ, by definition. For example, logic was epistemologically subjective prior to Aristotle, since no one had explicit rules for how to reason properly or identify logical fallacies. People just reasoned using intuition until the objective logical standards were discovered.

Some areas of inquiry are metaphysically subjective, like astrology. There are no objective criteria for what your horoscope should say, because the field has no basis in reality. If the objective criteria for an area of inquiry are not known, then that may be used as an argument for the position that that area of inquiry is metaphysically subjective – that is, that there are in fact no such criteria. This is the basis for the philosophical position that morality is subjective.

It is critically important that we not rest content with a subjective approach to any legitimate area of inquiry, but rather work to define objective standards for everything we do. In the absence of objective standards, disagreement will proliferate, and skepticism and mysticism will run rampant.

Plato’s Dialectic

Plato held that in philosophy, we arrive at the truth by means of a process of “dialectic.” Dialectic, for Plato, works as follows:

• We begin by having one person put forward an answer to the problem in question on the basis of certain arguments.
• Another person then comes along, points out flaws in the first person’s answer, and puts forward his own answer.
• Then a third person comes along, criticizes both viewpoints, and puts forward an answer that is better than either of them.
• etc.

Plato held that, over time, this process leads us closer and closer to the truth. This is illustrated by some of his dialogues.

Plato’s theory assumes that we have a way of rationally evaluating an answer to a philosophical question as plausible or implausible. Plato held that we could see this “intuitively,” but his account of intuition depends on his metaphysics, which most philosophers have rejected.

Another perspective on dialectic comes from David Hume. Hume agrees that it often happens in philosophy that one person puts a position forward, and then another person criticizes it and puts their own position forward. However, according to Hume, the intuitions that this process depends on are subjective products of “habit or custom.” So, while dialectic can arrive at conclusions that better appeal to a given person subjectively, it is not a source of objective truth like Plato thought.

I think the only way to answer Hume once and for all is to present a body of demonstrably true conclusions in philosophy. So long as philosophy is seen as an endless debate, many will be inclined to question whether it has any cognitive status at all. There have been a number of attempts to do this since Hume, and evaluating all of them is beyond my scope here.

In Defense of Self Evidence

A self evident proposition is a proposition that any rational person will agree is certainly true upon grasping it. In this post, I will demonstrate that there are self evident propositions.

The strongest argument for the claim that there are self evident propositions is to just list several of them so that the reader can see that some propositions are really self evident. Here are three:

• There is an objective reality.
• A thing is identical to itself.
• I am conscious.

I will explain each of these.

“There is an objective reality” means that there is a fact of the matter about something. For example, if I say that we landed on the Moon, and someone else denies that we landed on the Moon, there is a fact of the matter about which of us is right. The fact of the matter about whether we landed on the Moon is one component of the objective reality in which we live.

The existence of an objective reality is contained in every experience we have. When I experience the fact that my alarm clock is red, I can see immediately that my alarm clock really exists, that it really has certain properties like redness, and that its existence and properties are independent of my mind. This experience shows me directly that there is an objective reality.

“A thing is identical to itself” means that a thing is what it is. A tree is a tree, and has all of the properties required for being a tree. Symbolically, this is often expressed “A is A,” where A refers to anything that exists.

This proposition, called the law of identity, is contained in every thought and every observation we have. When you observe a computer, you also observe that that computer is a computer. When you think of the number one, you can see that the number one is the number one. This is one of the undeniable foundations of rational thought.

“I am conscious” means that I am aware of the world and can identify things that exist using my mind. I can perceive the things that exist, whether they be cars, animals, or anything else that is presented to my senses. I am actually aware of the world.

Obviously, the fact that we are conscious is forced upon us by every perception or thought we have. If I perceive a lamp, I can see that I am aware of that lamp. If I think about Nazi Germany, I can see that my mind is thinking about Nazi Germany. Every act of my consciousness contains consciousness. Thought and perception are undeniable data of experience.

Conclusion

Having gone through these examples of self evident propositions, we can see that there are in fact self evident propositions, since there can be no doubt about the existence of an objective reality, the law of identity, or consciousness.

Some philosophers have raised objections to the idea of the self evident, and I may address those objections in another post. Keep in mind, though, that even if we do not know the answer to some tricky objection, that casts no doubt on the idea of self evidence or the self evident propositions I have enumerated. We can see, just by looking at them, that any objection to these propositions has to fail, even if we cannot identify the error in a specific objection.

Disjunctive Syllogism

The disjunctive syllogism is a form of deductive reasoning that goes as follows:

1. Either p is true, or q is true.
2. p is false.
3. Therefore, q is true.

This is a deductively valid form of reasoning because, given that p and q are the only alternatives, and p is false, q has to be true. The conclusion follows necessarily from the premises in virtue of the form of the argument.

This form of reasoning is useful when we have a small set of hypotheses, because we can use it to narrow down which one is true. For example, in a murder trial, we might know that the only people at the scene of the crime were Alex and Bob. So, we could reason as follows.

1. The murderer was either Alex or Bob.
2. Alex is on video camera in a different room at the time of the murder, so he can’t be the murderer.
3. Therefore, the murderer was Bob.

Importantly, this requires us to actually have a good reason to believe that Alex and Bob were the only people at the scene of the crime. If there is evidence that there might have been a third person at the scene of the crime, then our argument commits the fallacy of the false dichotomy, because there is a third possibility, namely that the murderer was this third person. This may create “reasonable doubt” in the jury’s mind about whether Bob was the murderer, depending on the other facts.

However, alternative hypotheses cannot be generated arbitrarily. There has to be some reason to take a hypothesis seriously before it becomes an objection to our argument. For example, the defense attorney can’t say “maybe a Martian was the murderer” – that is a doubt, but it is not a reasonable one, and so does not undermine our argument.

Objective Definitions

I was asked on another website how we should treat definitions that aren’t strictly convertible with the concepts that they define. In other words, in mathematics and logic, you can generally just substitute a concept whenever its definition appears, because there is nothing more to the concept than its definition states. You can’t do that with a lot of definitions elsewhere. For example, a horse without hooves is still a horse even though it doesn’t strictly meet the definition of a horse.

However, even when we define a term in mathematics, we don’t generally do so as an end in itself, and if we did our definition would quickly be forgotten or discarded. We formulate our definitions in order to prove things from them. The definition names a useful starting point in our reasoning for seeking out and identifying logical connections that exist objectively.

So, on the view I’m defending, our main goal when we define something isn’t necessarily to come up with a definition in which the subject is strictly convertible with the predicate, it is to identify the essence of the subject. This is a true proposition, in genus and differentia, from which the most of the subject’s known attributes follow, whether causally or logically. If the definition is convertible with the concept it defines, great, but if not, that’s fine too.

So, when we’re defining, say, a horse, the goal shouldn’t be to come up with a proposition that’s true of every horse, although it would be great if we could. We want to find the essence, a proposition which identifies the genus and differentia from which the most of the attributes of horses follow. We want the definition to do this because it will enable us to draw the most true generalizations about horses in our subsequent research, although we may have to take particular exceptions like the occasional horse without hooves into account when we are reasoning about them specifically.

Putting God on Trial

A lot of atheists hold that although they don’t have any evidence that God exists, and therefore don’t believe in God, he might exist. It’s just very unlikely.

One of the atheists who hold this position is Matt Dillahunty, who compares the atheist’s position on God’s existence to a trial verdict. In a trial, the defendant is not found to be innocent, they are found “not guilty” – meaning that there wasn’t enough evidence to convict them of a crime. Analogously, according to Dillahunty, the atheist is not finding God innocent of existing, i.e., concluding that God does not exist. Rather, he is finding God “not guilty” of existing, meaning that there isn’t enough evidence to conclude that God exists.

I agree that there isn’t any good evidence for God’s existence, but the conclusion Dillahunty draws is not the correct one.

I like the analogy to a trial, so I’ll stick with that. Before a trial is held, there is a preliminary hearing to determine whether there is enough evidence to warrant even having a trial, which is a lengthy and laborious affair. Similarly, before considering a position, it is necessary to have some evidence indicating that it might be true, and is worth investing one’s limited time and energy in exploring further. Positions that fail this initial inspection are “arbitrary.”

Once we have concluded that a position is arbitrary, there is no need to consider it further. We are not obligated to assign it some “degree of probability,” since it has no relation to our knowledge, and hence there is no basis for such a probability assignment. Nor are we obligated to say that it is “possible” or “might be true.” A claim is possible, epistemically, if there are some facts in its favor, but there are no facts in favor of a claim if it is just an arbitrary assertion.

The correct position for an atheist to hold on God’s existence isn’t “it’s very unlikely, but it might be true,” it is “I have no reason to consider that idea.”

My Objections to Hume

I posted the following in response to a request for my thoughts on Hume:

My main two objections to Hume are his view of induction and his view of morality.

I don’t agree that inductive inferences are merely a matter of habit – we do perceive causality, although we perceive it originally in specific instances and then abstract the concept of causality from those instances. Causality isn’t immediately perceivable like the color red is, but we can learn of its existence by inference from things like pushing a ball and watching it roll, and scientific theories are broader generalizations induced from numerous directly perceivable causal connections like this.

I also don’t agree that morality is a matter of the sentiments rather than of relationships between things. We do originally become aware of moral distinctions by means of the sentiments – I don’t like being hurt, so I conclude that that’s bad, and I like having friends, so I conclude that that’s good. However, there is an objective moral standard that we can infer from these primitive moral beliefs, based on a specific kind of life that it is best for a human being to have, one centered on our own self interest.

So basically, I think Aristotle has better positions on these issues than Hume does. I might do a longer post on Hume later.

Evidence: A Definition and Example

There was a discussion of the concept of evidence on one of the forums I post to, so I posted the following analysis.

Evidence is a body of observations that have been logically integrated to their cause. I will give an illustration using one of Jerry Coyne’s lines of evidence for the theory of evolution in Why Evolution is True.

According to Coyne, the species of animals found on islands near continents bear significant similarities to the animals on the mainland, but they differ from the animals on the mainland in ways that allow them to fill the specific niches available on the island, and the only species of animals found on the island are ones small enough to be blown by the wind or carried on driftwood to the island. Therefore, they must have been carried from the mainland to the island and evolved into a variety of new species once there.

Let’s take this apart into its components.

First, Coyne’s argument depends on observation. Scientists had to make countless measurements of species that live on islands near a continent and the species on the nearby mainlands to arrive at this conclusion. For example, in one case, they had to measure the beaks of birds on the island to show that they were adapted to eating nuts as opposed to the beaks of the birds on the mainland.

Second, Coyne’s argument integrates these observations. The observations are put together into a coherent whole that encompasses the fact that the species on the island are similar to the species on the mainland, the fact that there are specific niches on the islands that these species have adapted to fill, and the fact that the species on the island are all relatively small or have the ability to swim. These are all made part of a unified narrative.

Third, Coyne’s argument integrates these observations in accordance with logic. Coyne does not appeal to mysticism to explain the observations he cites, and he does not invent his explanation out of whole cloth. Rather, he logically infers the conclusion that is necessitated by the available facts.

Finally, Coyne’s argument logically integrates these observations to their cause. Causality is an entity acting according to its identity. Coyne’s argument reveals that the observations he cites are all manifestations of entities acting in an orderly fashion, according to their identities. The only entities that get to the islands are the ones that have the ability to do so due to their size or ability to fly or swim, and the only entities that survive on the islands are the ones that are adapted to fill the available niches, in obedience to causality.

I hope this has helped clarify the concept of evidence for you.

Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology: Chapter 1

In this post, I will summarize chapter 1 of Ayn Rand’s book, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. This chapter describes the stages a child goes through leading up to the ability to use concepts, as well as the basis for those steps in reality.

According to Rand, there are three stages that a child goes through:

First, the stage of sensations. Rand suggests that “an infant’s sensory experience is an undifferentiated chaos” which is forgotten by the time one becomes an adult. Adults can infer that they once experienced a sensation stage, but they cannot bring a sensation into their conscious awareness.

Second, the stage of percepts. Rand says “a percept is a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism.” Adults are consciously aware of percepts, and they form the level at which we are directly aware of reality.

At the perceptual level, the child attains the (implicit, not yet explicit) concept of an existent, a thing that exists. This implicit concept develops through three sub-stages: “entity,” referring to the objects around him or her, “identity,” referring to the fact that he or she can distinguish these entities from the other things he or she sees, and “unit,” which refers to the fact that there are similarities and differences between these objects’ identities.

Rand next spends some time on the concept “unit.”

A unit is an existent regarded as a separate member of a group of two or more similar members. (Two stones are two units; so are two square feet of ground, if regarded as distinct parts of a continuous stretch of ground.) … Units are things viewed by a consciousness in certain existing relationships.

Rand points out that this concept allows us to extrapolate beyond our observations by defining a standard and thinking in terms of repetitions of the standard. I think what she has in mind here is primarily physics; physicists define a specific distance as the meter and then do physics in terms of repetitions or divisions of that standard meter. The point applies to any concept, though. For example, we can recognize more than one country as instances of the concept “country” because we can abstract from the specific number of people in the population, the specific geographic location, the specific system of government, etc. These are essentially just repetitions of the same thing, or of similar things we have seen elsewhere.

Summary in bullet points:

1. Sensation stage
2. Perceptual stage
   1. Existent
   2. Entity
   3. Identity
3. Unit (Entry to conceptual stage)